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Affective Habits: Sensation, Duration and Automation 
Carolyn Pedwell 
 
This chapter1 begins with a critical hypothesis: in order to better understand the logics, 
challenges and potentialities of social change at the current conjuncture, we might need to 
attend more carefully to the relationship between affect and habit. That is, in the midst of the 
turn to affect, renewed interest in habit, the rise of various ‘new’ materialisms and ecological 
approaches and the growing salience of algorithmic life, both apprehending and pursuing 
socio-political transformation may require closer engagement with the emergent links among 
sensation, duration, repetition, iteration, automation and atmosphere.  
 
I use the term ‘affect’ to encompass a varied collection of sensorial processes, relations and 
experiences – ranging from individual expressions of feeling to the production of sensation 
within human-technology assemblages. In doing so, I acknowledge how embodied sensations 
and psychic and cognitive experiences are constitutively intertwined2 – while also 
recognising that affective processes always exceed the boundaries of human subjectivity and 
consciousness.3 Indeed, affect is an inherently relational term – it signifies emergent 
interactions of human and non- or more-than human actors which are productive of different 
kinds of sensation and becoming. In turn, ‘atmosphere’ is a key concept that helps us to 
address ‘how collective affects become conditions that shape without determining capacities 
to affect and be affected’4 – whether this pertains to the fluctuating mix of tension and 
excitement pervading a competitive sporting event or the differential sensorial experience of 
inhabiting an institutional space marked by whiteness. In short, atmospheres are, as the 
 
1 This essay adapts some material from previously published work by the author: Carolyn Pedwell, 
‘Transforming Habit: Revolution, Routine and Social Change’ in Cultural Studies 31 (2017), pp. 93–120; idem, 
‘Mediated Habits: Images, Networked Affect and Social Change’ in Subjectivity 10 (2017), pp. 147–169. 
2 Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2004).  
3 Patricia Ticineto Clough, Jean Halley (eds.), The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2007).  
4 Ben Anderson, Encountering Affect: Capacities, Apparatuses, Conditions (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014).   
 2 
geographer Ben Anderson puts it, the ‘mediums through which ordinary affective life is lived 
and organised’.5  
 
I became interested in the relations between ‘the affective’ and ‘the habitual’ through writing 
a book about empathy.6 I was struck during this process by how much of the work on 
empathy in particular, and affect and emotion more generally, is invested in the 
transformational promise of a kind of affective revolution at the level of the embodied subject 
or social collective. The underlying assumption of many calls for empathy – or indeed other 
emotions, whether compassion, hope, shame or anger – as affective panacea seems to be that, 
deep down, people are capable of acting ethically, but are routinely prevented from doing so 
because they are too busy, too ignorant, or too isolated from the reality of the injustice that 
others endure. If people (especially those in positions of social privilege) could only be 
affected powerfully enough, through being exposed to the visceral truth of others’ suffering – 
and their own complicity in it – these narratives suggest, they would be compelled to 
fundamentally alter their ways of seeing and being in the world.   
 
Yet is this how ‘progressive’ change – or indeed any enduring social change – actually 
works? Does a radical break or a revolution at the cognitive, psychic or affective level 
provide the basis for sustained transformation at a deep embodied, material and structural 
level? One of the problems with this seductive (and ubiquitous) narrative of empathy’s 
transformative force is that it rarely addresses the question of what happens after empathy in 
an explicit or sustained way. Such accounts also often fail to engage fully with the powerfully 
ingrained (though not necessarily conscious or visible) patterns and habits that function to 
keep existing modes of being, seeing, feeling and acting in place.   
 
Visions of affective transformation informed by the continental philosophy of Baruch 
Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze do not subscribe to linear notions of time and social progress and 
tend not to invest in emotional identification as a driver of change. Yet in other important 
respects this work resonates with narratives of transformation via empathy. Many Deleuzian-
inspired accounts focus on encounters that produce what Brian Massumi refers to as ‘a shock 
 
5 Ibid., p. 161.  
6 Carolyn Pedwell, Affective Relations: The Transnational Politics of Empathy (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2014).   
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to thought’:7 an affective jolt that works less to reveal truth than to ‘thrust us involuntarily 
into a mode of critical inquiry.’8 What is often valued in such narratives is the promise of 
those fugitive affective moments in which thought might escape the discursive relations of 
power that normally constrain it, allowing something genuinely different to emerge. My 
sense, however, was that across these and other narratives of affective transformation we are 
offered enticing accounts of how affect might signal or spark embodied change, but less 
compelling explanations of the processes through which that change might produce effects 
that endure.  
 
These concerns led me to explore how paying greater attention to the dynamics of habit 
might help to enrich and reorient theories of affect and affective transformation. Over the past 
decade, an emergent critical return to the notions of habit and habituation has been gaining 
momentum as scholars seek to rethink the contemporary workings of material and social life9 
– from the psychic and embodied habits of white privilege,10 to the patterned dynamics of 
biopolitical governance,11 to the habituated gestures of the athletic body.12 Might engaging 
more substantially with these literatures, I wondered, enable us to better grapple not only 
with how patterns of action become deeply ingrained, but also with how new modes of 
affective and socio-political engagement and responsivity might be actualised and sustained?  
 
But what exactly is a habit? In Principles of Psychology, William James, who was trained as 
a medical doctor and psychologist, defines a habit by two key criteria: firstly, it simplifies the 
 
7 Brian Massumi (ed.), A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari: Expressions After Deleuze 
and Guattari (London: Routledge, 2002). 
8 Jill Bennett, Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma and Contemporary Art (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2006), p. 11.  
 
9 See, for example, Clare Carlisle, Mark Sinclair, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, in Felix Ravaisson, Of Habit, trans. 
Clare Carlisle, Mark Sinclair (London and New York: Continuum, [1838]2008), pp. 1–21; Catherine Malabou, 
‘Addiction and Grace: Preface to Felix Ravaisson’s Of Habit’, in Felix Ravaisson, Of Habit, pp. vii–xx; Tony 
Bennett et al (eds.), ‘Habit and Habituation: Governance and the Social’, in Body and Society 19.2&3 (2013), 
pp. 3–29; Tom Sparrow, Adam Hutchinson (eds.), A History of Habit: From Aristotle to Bourdieu (New York: 
Lexington Books, 2013); Clare Carlisle, On Habit (London and New York: Routledge, 2014); John-David 
Dewsbury, David Bissell, ‘Habit geographies’, in Cultural Geographies 21.1 (2015), pp. 22–146; Wendy Hui 
Kyong Chun, Updating to Remain the Same: Habitual New Media (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT press, 2016); 
Carolyn Pedwell, ‘Habit and the Politics of Social Change: A Comparison of Nudge Theory and Pragmatist 
Philosophy’, in Body and Society 23.4 (2017), pp. 56–94; Pedwell, 2017a and b (footnote 1). 
10 Shannon Sullivan, Revealing Whiteness: The Unconscious Habits of White Privilege (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006).  
11 Tony Bennett, ‘Habit: Time, Freedom and Governance’, in Body and Society 19.2&3 (2013), pp. 107–135; 
Lisa Blackman, ‘Habit and Affect: Revitalizing a Forgotten History’, in Body and Society 19.2&3 (2013), pp. 
186–216.   
12 Chris Shilling, Changing Bodies: Habit, Crisis and Creativity (London: Sage, 2008); David Bissell, ‘Habit 
Displaced: The Disruption of Skilful Performance’, in Geographical Research 51.2 (2013), pp. 120–129. 
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movements required to achieve a given result, whilst also making them more accurate and 
diminishing fatigue.13 For example, ‘a lock works better after being used for some time; at 
the outset more force was required to overcome a certain roughness in its mechanism’. 
Secondly, ‘a habit diminishes the conscious attention with which acts are performed’.14 Like 
James, the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey understands habits as involving forms of 
embodied automation and concurs that ‘the more suavely efficient a habit the more 
unconsciously it operates’.15 Dewey, however, pays more attention to how habits are 
produced through the ‘cooperation of an organism and an environment’,16 and thus 
constitutively imbricate bodies and social, structural and ecological conditions. 
 
Habit however not only attunes us to the powerful automated processes and mechanisms 
underlying the tendency for patterns of oppression and inequality to persist; it has also a 
necessary, yet counterintuitive, role in enabling meaningful and durable forms of socio-
political transformation. James, for example, pre-figures Pierre Bourdieu’s work on habitus 
and socio-economic class when he refers to habit as ‘the enormous fly-wheel of society, its 
most precious conservative agent’.17 And yet in embodying the ‘plasticity’ of living 
organisms and social systems, habits simultaneously, James contends, hold the key to 
material change. While the automatic force of habit can compel us to repeat previous modes 
of action again and again, it is nonetheless only through embodied processes of habituation 
that new tendencies may be created which are deeply rooted and robust enough to endure.   
 
In this way, James’ and Dewey’s philosophical pragmatism resonates with the legacy of habit 
in continental philosophy, namely the work of the French philosopher Felix Ravaisson. In Of 
Habit,18 Ravaisson, who was an important reference for Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, 
explores the role of habit in processes of being and becoming. As Catherine Malabou notes, 
for Ravaisson, habit involves a repetition, but it is a repetition that produces a difference; that 
is, ‘an aptitude for change’.19 In transforming a potentiality into a tendency through the work 
of repetition, habit illustrates powerfully that ‘if being was able to change once, in the manner 
 
13 William James, Habit (London: Forgotten Books, [1914]2004), p. 26. 
14 Ibid., p. 7, p. 31. 
15 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (London: Digireads.com, 
([1922]2012), p. 71.  
16 Ibid., p. 10 
17 James, [1914]2014 (footnote 13), p. 51.  
18 Felix Ravaisson, Of Habit, trans. Clare Carlisle, Mark Sinclair (London and New York: Continuum, 
[1838]2008). 
19 Malabou in Ravaisson, 2008 (footnote 18), p. ix. 
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of contracting a habit … It is available for a change to come’.20 Together, this work suggests 
that ‘freedom and power are found in and through the constitution of habits, not through their 
elimination’.21 
 
The challenge is thus to explore what might be generative about thinking affect and habit 
together to understand the dynamics of social change. Habit formation and modification are, 
as these pragmatist and continental philosophers illustrate, vital to individual and collective 
change. Affect may offer the spark that catalyses embodied transformation, yet without some 
form of habituation, enduring change may fail to take shape. And yet, when affective 
responses are sustained or repeated over time they may lose their radical edge, as we find 
ourselves compulsively engaging in potentially stultifying practices of ‘affective citation’.22 
What is it, then, that enables meaningful cognitive, psychic and embodied change generated 
(or signalled) by affect to take shape and endure rather than simply peak and collapse or 
become quickly re-assimilated into ‘business as usual’? How, in other words, might we better 
understand the materialisation of affect in this context?   
 
In pursuing these questions, I draw on and extend earlier vital scholarship in affect and 
emotion studies. In asking why social injustice feels so intractable despite our collective 
efforts to dislodge it, for instance, Sara Ahmed writes in The Cultural Politics of Emotion 
about our habitual affective attachment to social norms.23 In The Promise of Happiness, she 
explores ‘the everyday habits of happiness’ and ‘how such habits involve ways of thinking 
about the world that shape how the world coheres’.24 Although happiness is widely regarded 
as ‘what gives purpose, meaning and order to human life’, Ahmed considers how its pursuit 
often involves ‘the comfort of repetition … following lines that have already been given in 
advance’, in ways that reproduce normative ideals and expectations.25 We might also 
consider Lauren Berlant’s account of how ‘cruel optimism’ keeps us habitually reiterating 
self-defeating efforts to pursue ‘the good life’ in deteriorating conditions of social and 
economic opportunity26 – or Eve Sedgwick’s discussion of how dominant affective habits in 
 
20 Ibid., p. viii.  
21 Sullivan, 2006 (footnote 10), p. 24.  
22 Margaret Wetherell, Affect and Emotion: A New Social Sciences Approach (London: Sage, 2012).  
23 Ahmed, 2004 (footnote 2).  
24 Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 14. 
25 Ibid., p. 1, p. 48. 
26 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (London and Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).   
 6 
critical theory may trap us in epistemological ruts that prevent engagement with the evolving 
complexity of material and political life.27  
 
As these examples indicate, theories of affect fuel explanations of social change but they also 
furnish powerful interpretations of political stasis and ‘stuckness’. Other scholars address 
more explicitly the paradoxical nature of affective practice: how emotional patterns that 
produce ‘regulation’ always also imply ‘potential’; that is, as Margaret Wetherell puts it, the 
possibility for embodied relations to be ‘otherwise’.28 In her genealogical analysis of some of 
the founding concepts in social psychology, Lisa Blackman similarly highlights the ways in 
which affect–habit interactions can produce ‘movement and stasis, being and becoming and 
process and fixity’.29 It is important to underscore in this vein that while Sedgwick famously 
described ‘paranoid reading’ as the habitual approach to critique that always already knows 
what it will find, her discussion of ‘reparative reading’ explores the potential of new affective 
habits that might reorient post-structuralist scholarship in generative ways.30 Channelling 
Raymond Williams’ account of ‘structures of feeling’,31 and how we may encounter ‘pre-
emergent’ social and material forces, Sedgwick’s engagement with reparation is, in part, an 
exploration of how critical theory might better connect with transformation as it is 
happening.   
 
Building on this important work, this essay explores how bringing together contemporary 
affect theory with classical philosophies of habit may enable us to develop a richer 
understanding of the logics of social change. In the first section, I consider how James, 
Dewey and Ravaisson addressed the role of sensation and feeling in their philosophies of 
habit. While Ravaisson’s ‘double law of habit’ indicates how habitual or sustained affect 
tends to lose force over time, it also suggests that it is the mode of attention that we bring to 
affective states that might prove transformative – a perspective that resonates with Ahmed’s 
account of (un)happiness. The second section explores the dynamics of affect and atmosphere 
within ‘habit assemblages’ that imbricate organisms and environments. Drawing on examples 
related to white privilege, athletic proficiencies and algorithmic technologies, I discuss how 
 
27 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching, Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2003).  
28 Wetherell, 2012 (footnote 22), p. 4. 
29 Blackman, 2013 (footnote 11), p. 186. 
30 Sedgwick, 2003 (footnote 27).   
31 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977).      
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transformation emerges not only through reflexive processes, but also via alterations to the 
environments and atmospheres in which habits are formed, which may work to reorient 
human tendencies below the level of active consciousness. Throughout, I aim to illustrate that 
processes of affecting and being affected and of habituation and re-habituation interact with 
one another in complex ways and it is this interaction that is significant to the workings of 
socio-political change.  
 
Beyond Desensitization: Affective Inhabitation  
 
Although not their specific focus, pragmatist and continental philosophers of habit had 
pertinent things to say about the relationships among affect, emotion and transformation. For 
Dewey, in Human Nature and Conduct,32 the problem with modes of social reform that 
depend predominantly on the production of certain feelings (i.e. the generation of empathy, 
compassion or moral indignation) is that they tend to remove thought from embodied action 
and the individual from their environment. That is, such strategies assume that exposure to 
new affective knowledge is enough to actualise ‘progressive’ change, without attending to the 
imbricated embodied and environmental factors that work powerfully to perpetuate existing 
patterns of behaviour. More broadly, Dewey acknowledges the potential of feeling to spark 
cognitive and embodied transformation, yet he is suspicious of the capacity for such change 
to be anything other than transitory: ‘impulse burns itself up. Emotion cannot be kept at its 
full tide’.33 With this latter point, he gestures to a key contradiction animating the long 
history of investing in feeling as a driver of social change: On the one hand, affect may 
powerfully catalyse or signal embodied transformation, yet without some form of habituation, 
durable change may fail to take shape. On the other hand, when affect is sustained or 
repeated over time it may fizzle out or lose its radical edge.   
 
It is, of course, this assumption regarding the temporal inevitability of affective 
desensitization that underscores the logic of concepts such as ‘compassion fatigue’.34 As 
Susan Sontag famously argues in Regarding the Pain of Others, a central truth in affective 
life is the ‘wearing off’ of shock through repetition.35 Instead of producing a ‘shock to 
 
32 Dewey, [1922]2012 (footnote 15).  
33 Ibid., p. 101.  
34 Susan Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1998).   
35 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (London: Penguin, 2003).   
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thought’36 that generates critical inquiry or action, her work suggests that ubiquitous images 
of suffering may simply elicit ‘the bemused awareness, continually restocked by 
photographic information, that terrible things happen’.37 Moreover, unless they lead to 
action, repeated compassionate responses can become no more than an affective script; an 
emotional short-hand that modulates feelings in familiar ways but does little to change 
everyday habits of social interaction and political engagement.38  
 
The tendency for the force of affect to weaken or dissipate over time is central to Ravaisson’s 
discussion of the logics of habituation. Within his ‘double law of habit’, sensation, once 
repeated or sustained, dulls and loses force whereas repeated or sustained action gains in 
strength and momentum. As Ravaisson puts it:  
 
The continuity or the repetition of passion weakens it; the continuity or repetition of action exalts and 
strengthens it. Prolonged or repeated sensation diminishes gradually and eventually fades away. 
Prolonged or repeated movement becomes gradually easier, quicker and more assured.39  
 
James’s analysis resonates with and extends this framework: The repetition of feelings that 
routinely fail to be translated into action, he suggests, frequently leads to affective inertia: 
‘The weeping of a Russian lady over the fictitious personages of the play, while her 
coachman is freezing to death on his seat outside is the sort of thing that everywhere happens 
on a less glaring scale’.40 Not unlike Sontag, then, these philosophers appear to view 
compassion as an ‘unstable emotion’ that ‘needs to be translated into action’ if it is not to 
‘wither’.41  
 
Together, this scholarship highlights the limits of models of affirmative social change 
premised exclusively on affective rupture or revolution. Yet, I wondered, are feeling and 
action as opposed as these perspectives would seem to suggest? Is habituated affect always 
deadening of radical political force? What are the roles of passivity and activity within habit-
affect interactions? While Ravaisson’s analysis would appear to provide strong theoretical 
underpinning for the equation of repeated sensation with increasing passivity, the workings of 
 
36 Massumi (ed.), 2002 (footnote 7).  
37 Sontag, 2003 (footnote 35), p. 11. 
38 Pedwell, ‘Mediated Habits’, 2017 (footnote 9).  
39 Ravaisson, [1838]2008 (footnote 18), p. 49. 
40 James, [1914]2004 (footnote 13), p. 63. 
41 Sontag, 2003 (footnote 35), p. 90.  
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habit and affect are actually more complicated than this. As Clare Carlisle notes, the 
Anglican bishop Joseph Butler, in his 1736 text The Analogy of Religion argued that, in 
particular circumstances, feeling or sensing can be ‘turned into an activity’ which can 
‘engender a heightening of experience rather than a diminution of feeling’.42 Ravaisson 
illustrates this point through a comparison between the ‘drunkard’ and the connoisseur: 
While the drunkard ‘tastes his wine less and less as he continues to drink’, the ‘connoisseur 
develops a refined palate that makes him increasingly discerning’43 – his taste ‘becomes more 
and more delicate and subtle’.44 That is, through his attentiveness, the connoisseur transforms 
the effects of affective repetition so that they intensify, rather than diminish, his sensorial 
experience. From this perspective, feeling and action are not as distinct or oppositional as 
they may first appear; in fact, they are intimately intertwined. Significantly, this kind of 
example does not invalidate the double law of habit; instead, it indicates that sensing has 
been made into an activity, ‘so that the law of active habit has greater effect than the law of 
passive habituation’.45   
 
In complicating the presumed link between feeling and inaction, Butler’s and Ravaisson’s 
interventions resonate with the philosophy of Spinoza and Deleuze46, for whom affect 
indicates constant movement, flow and transformation in a universe where nothing ever truly 
repeats. The above discussion thus raises critical questions about how we currently 
understand socio-political activity, progress and change – what we think counts as 
transformative political action as well as how, and why, we routinely interpret passivity as 
that which simply reifies the status quo. While repeated or sustained affect is frequently 
associated with the de-politicising reversion of activity into ‘passive forms of “being made 
aware” or “having been stated”’,47 what happens when we view passivity as involving its 
own potentially generative forms of activity? In other words, what might be opened up when 
we re-read passivity as affective inhabitation? 
 
 
42 Carlisle, 2014 (footnote 9), p. 82. 
43 Ibid., p. 81. 
44 Ravaisson, [1838]2008 (footnote 18), p. 49. 
45 Carlisle, 2014 (footnote 9), p. 81. 
46 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (London and New York: Continuum, [1968]2011).   
47 Jodi Dean, ‘Affect and Drive’, in Hillis et al (eds.), Networked Affect (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2015), 
p. 99.  
 10 
Ahmed addresses these questions in The Promise of Happiness when she considers how 
unhappiness ‘might offer a pedagogic lesson on the limits of the promise of happiness’.48 
Although ‘being unhappy’ is often represented as a passive state to be avoided through taking 
appropriate action (i.e. making ‘the right’ choices and staying on ‘the right’ path), something 
different might transpire, Ahmed suggests, when we ‘think about unhappiness as more than a 
feeling that should be overcome’.49 Indeed, what affectively inhabiting unhappiness might 
enable is an understanding of how dominant narratives of happiness routinely ‘redescribe 
social norms as social goods’50 – whether those norms pertain to heterosexual marriage or 
neoliberal subjecthood. In this context, Ahmed proposes that unhappiness itself could be 
interpreted as a form of political action: ‘the act of saying no or of pointing out injuries’ that 
‘affirms something, right from the beginning’.51   
 
Ahmed’s argument here is not, of course, that we ‘have an obligation to be unhappy’,52 but 
rather that, as Butler and Ravaisson suggest, it is the mode of attention that we bring to 
affective states that might prove personally and politically transformative. Continuing with 
the theme of affective inhabitation, a number of further questions arise: If affect functions not 
only as a jolt or spark that might move us (at least temporarily) but also a ‘binding 
technique’53 that keeps us attached or ‘stuck’ to a particular state or site, how might we 
consider some of the more productive implications of such affective attachment? When might 
such immersive processes generate not (or not only) affective desensitization, but rather (or 
also) attentiveness, connection and care that transform sensing ‘into an activity’ with a range 
of political and ethical implications?   
 
Such concerns are engaged suggestively by Jill Bennet in Empathic Vision.54 Here, Bennett 
explores the capacity of our affective engagement with ‘non-representational’ art to transform 
habitual modes of perception in ways that may be conducive to critical ethics and politics.  
Crucially, however, she stresses, drawing on the work of Deleuze and Massumi, that there is 
an important difference between images that are simply shocking and those which function as 
 
48 Ahmed, 2010 (footnote 24), p. 217. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., p. 2.  
51 Ibid., p. 207. 
52 Ibid., p. 217. 
53 Dean, 2015 (footnote 47).  
54 Bennett, 2006 (footnote 8). 
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a ‘shock to thought’55. Beyond the ‘the activation of an affective trigger’, genuinely 
transformative engagement with visual art requires the development of an ‘affective 
connection’56 that sustains sensation to enable different forms of affective inhabitation – 
compelling us to notice, attend to and reflect on the intensity our encounter and its critical 
implications. When this happens, I want to suggest, sensing can be ‘turned into an activity’ 
that engages the possibility of transformation at the level of habit – calling our attention to, as 
Tony Bennett puts it, the emergence of ‘gaps, intervals and blips’ in patterned perception 
which may ‘afford the opportunity for new forms of practice to be improvised’.57 Indeed, if 
perception is continually mediated by ‘affective scripts’ that have become habitual58, the very 
fact that such scripts are reproduced through the force of habit means that they are open to the 
possibility of modification. It is when we are made consciously aware of such patterns of 
seeing, through a sense that they have been disrupted, that we become attuned to the 
surfacing of ‘actionable spaces’59 for transformation.   
 
What is clear from this discussion is that meaningful and enduring forms of transformation 
require the ongoing interaction of affect and habit– a relational dynamic central to processes 
of affective inhabitation. But under what environmental, material and affective circumstances 
sensing prompted by particular encounters or experiences might become an activity that 
enables intervention in everyday conduct to re-make existing habits of seeing, thinking, 
feeling and acting remains an important open question.   
 
Habit Assemblages, Affect and Atmosphere  
 
When we contemplate the workings of habit it is often easiest, and perhaps most meaningful, 
to conceptualise habits as personal embodied capacities or characteristics. Habits, for Dewey, 
however, are never simply individual or indeed collective; rather, they are relational 
transactions between organisms and environments which are always in process. Instead of 
conceptualising individual habits in isolation (as if they were owned by particular subjects), 
then, this work compels us to think more ecologically about the workings and implications of 
 
55 Massumi, 2002 (footnote 7). 
56 Bennett, 2006 (footnote 8), p. 5.  
57 Bennett, 2013 (footnote 11), p. 126, p. 125. 
58 Sontag, 2003 (footnote 35). 
59 Bennett, 2013 (footnote 11). 
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habit assemblages. A key question thus becomes how to identify and intervene in ‘mind-
body-environmental assemblages’60 in ways that might enable affirmative change.  
 
The previous section addressed the transformative potential of becoming aware of our less-
than-conscious habits in ways that might enable us to improvise new forms of practice.  
Thinking through habit assemblages, however, suggests that transformation emerges not only 
via ‘intelligent’ intervention61 in everyday conduct, but also via alterations to the 
environments and atmospheres in which habits are formed – processes which may function to 
reorient human tendencies below the level of active consciousness. From this perspective, 
durable change might require something different to models premised on the exposure of 
pernicious patterns or the generation of critical reflexivity. In this vein, Dewey argues that, if 
affirmative transformation is the goal, compelling people to focus on what is wrong, on what 
they should not be doing, could be the worst possible approach because it maintains attention 
on ‘the bad result’ rather than on a potentially generative change in the making. Similarly, as 
Sedgwick suggests in her account of paranoid reading, repeated acts of exposing ‘the bad’, 
and mimetically tracing its contours, often work precisely to reproduce its force.62 
 
One key area in which such provocative contentions are being grappled with is the affective 
politics of racism. As Sullivan discusses in Revealing Whiteness63, it has often been assumed 
that providing data regarding the lack of scientific basis for the category of ‘race’ or raising 
consciousness regarding the destructive implications of racism will contribute to the end of 
racial discrimination. Yet, in targeting conscious rationality, such strategies often do not 
address the unconscious psychic and affective habits underlying white privilege – habits 
which may actively resist efforts to unveil them. Rather than only confronting habits of racial 
privilege directly, Sullivan proposes that we might more productively focus on transforming 
the ‘political, social, physical, economic, psychological, aesthetic and other environments 
that “feed” them’64 – an approach that aims to disrupt the automatic stimulation of psychic 
defence mechanisms linked to white fears of lost privilege and control, while simultaneously 
avoiding the amplifying repetition of insidious racialising patterns and problematics.  
 
 
60 Tony Bennett et al (eds.), ‘Habit and Habituation: Governance and the Social’, in Body and Society 19.2&3 
(2013), pp. 3–29 (footnote 9).  
61 Dewey, [1922]2012 (footnote 15), p. 15. 
62 Sedgwick, 2003 (footnote 27). 
63 Sullivan, 2006 (footnote 10).  
64 Ibid., p. 9.  
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As part of a wider anti-racist politics and praxis, environmentally-attuned techniques are 
multiple and diverse. Some work largely imperceptibly, re-aligning embodied routines and 
interactions through adjustments to environments, infrastructures and atmospheres – as in the 
design of architectures that aim to encourage ethical cohabitation or what Paul Gilroy calls 
‘multicultural conviviality’.65 Other approaches, through choreographing affective 
disruptions to the smooth-running of habits, seek to shake up habitual expectations of white 
privilege – for instance, a recent photo essay published in O: The Oprah Magazine, which 
features images of talking and laughing Asian women at a nail salon having pedicures done 
by white women, a young white girl gazing up and multiple shelves of black dolls, and a 
Latina woman in a luxurious apartment being served tea by a white maid.66 The hope is that, 
if collectively developed and enacted across multiple sites of socio-political salience, such 
techniques will subtly, yet powerfully, intervene in everyday modes of seeing, feeling, 
relating and responding – enabling the development new anti-racist tendencies and 
dispositions. 
  
However, as pragmatist and continental philosophers of habit underscore, environmental 
changes – be they material or immaterial, internal or external – are not always (if often) 
amenable to our control. As James argues, constituted ourselves as ‘bundles of habits’67 we 
are always already part of the shifting relations in which we seek to intervene and, as such, 
Dewey points out, ‘there is no ready-made self behind activities’68. Moreover, singular 
actions can have unexpected ripple effects throughout relational networks and consequently 
prediction of human-environmental interactions is a tenuous exercise.  
 
The geographer David Bissell addresses the volatility of habit-affect assemblages in his 
account of ‘the yips’; a condition affecting elite golfers in which ‘short putts and chips 
requiring fine coordination skills and motor control … for no apparent reason [become] 
disrupted by sudden and unpredictable involuntary twitches in [the] hand’.69 Although this 
phenomenon might be interpreted as ‘a form of muscular fatigue from over-practice’, this 
 
65 See Paul Gilroy, After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture (London: Routledge, 2004); Greg Noble, 
‘Cosmopolitan Habits: The Capacities and Habitats of Intercultural Conviviality’, in Body and Society 19.2&3 
(2013), pp. 162–185.  
66 Sarah Harvard, ‘These Three Images Made a Powerful Statement about Race and Power Among Women’, 16 
May 2017, Mic, https://mic.com/articles/177195/these-three-pictures-make-a-powerful-statement-about-race-
and-power-among-women#.8LLLwrDo6 (accessed: 1.12.2018). 
67 James, [1914]2004 (footnote 13), p. 1.  
68 Dewey, [1922]2012 (footnote 15), p. 13. 
69 Bissell, 2013 (footnote 12), p. 120. 
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explanation discounts the fact that the yips tended to emerge only ‘when playing under 
pressure’ in a competition environment.70 For Bissell, this points to the role of anxiety, affect 
and atmosphere in habit assemblages; how sudden transformations to embodied habits can 
emerge through immaterial processes in ways we may not be able to calculate or control.   
 
More than this, however, Bissell draws on Ravaisson’s philosophy to suggest that we might, 
in fact, ‘apprehend the yips as a new habit that inserts itself within the golfing body’.71 
Indeed, for the French philosopher, it is ‘one and the same force that gives rise to desirable 
habits involved in skilful performance and the less desirable habits of illness, both exhibiting 
a form of creative non-teleological evolution’.72 From this perspective, Bissell proposes that 
‘skilled performances might be better understood as competencies that temporarily possess 
us’ – an observation that underscores Dewey’s central claim that habits do not ‘reside within 
bodies … but are the dynamic through which bodies come into being in the specific way that 
they do’.73 Beyond the realm of sport, this example illustrates powerfully that ingrained 
forms of habituation are more vulnerable than we might assume and habit-affect interactions 
will always exceed the reach of human mastery.  
 
In addressing the complexity and unpredictability of habit assemblages we also need to 
consider the role of non-living entities and processes in such relations – how habits can take 
on a life of their own that far exceeds human modes of sensing, perceiving and cognition. I 
am thinking here especially about the growing salience of pattern recognition via algorithmic 
technologies and artificial intelligence in everyday life. In our current age of media analytics, 
an ever-growing swath of ‘our cultural experiences, social interactions, and decision-making 
are governed by large-scale software systems’ that operate via algorithmic procedures.74 For 
the affect theorist Patricia Clough, it is important to note that such technologies are ‘no 
longer slowed by the process or practice of translating back to human consciousness’.75 
Significantly, adaptive algorithmic environments are also providing resources for ‘the 
 
70 Ibid., p. 120. 
71 Ibid., p. 125 (italics by author). 
72 Ibid.  
73 Ibid., p. 127. 
74 Lev Manovich, ‘The Algorithms of our Lives’, 16t December 2013, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Algorithms-of-Our-Lives-/143557 (accessed: 1.12.2018). 
75 Patricia Ticineto Clough et al, ‘The Datalogical Turn’ in Philip Vannini (ed.), Non-Representational 
Methodologies: Re-envisioning Research (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 146–164. 
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inanimate to become sentient’76 – dynamics that raise crucial questions concerning our 
capacities to intervene in contemporary ecologies of habit.  
 
These techno-social developments do not, in my view, signal the irrelevance of human 
sensation, cognition or interpretation within projects of social transformation that might 
address the links between affect and habit. But they do, as Mark Hansen contends, point to 
the need for ‘fundamental rethinking of the human and of human experience’ in relation to 
‘networks of media technologies that operate predominately, if not almost entirely, outside 
the scope of human modes of awareness’.77 From this perspective, Massumi’s influential 
concerns regarding critical theory’s tendency to engage with the non-human as a ‘construct of 
the human’78 are increasingly salient.  Habits are always more-than-human and the processes 
they enable – whether those of regulation or potentiality – work at scales and speeds that are 
not always ‘our own’. As such, thinking affectively, materially and ecologically about these 
dynamics necessitates moving beyond ‘the body’, ‘the subject’ and ‘the human’ as central 
touchstones – while appreciating that habit is precisely what connects us constitutively to 
non-human processes, infrastructures, and entities; which are always part of ourselves.  
 
Collectively, these examples underscore why pursuing social transformation at the level of 
habit requires a speculative and responsive (rather than calculative and predictive) approach. 
As Dewey’s philosophical pragmatism suggests, such an orientation necessitates remaining 
alert to the changing dimensions of a situation as it unfolds temporally and spatially, instead 
of assuming that fixed trajectories can be known in advance. This imperative resonates with 
affect theory’s interest in sensing and responding to change as it is happening – whether via 
Williams’ structures of feeling, Sedgwick’s reparative reading or Ahmed’s everyday habits of 
happiness. For these scholars, what is vital to the possibility of affirmative transformation is 
not that we fixate on a faraway future, but rather that we affectively inhabit the present, 
understood as itself active and brimming with change. Not all elements of habit assemblages 
are knowable, let alone controllable, and the dynamics of affect and atmosphere will always 
exceed our attempts to govern them. Nonetheless, it is only through inhabiting the affects, 
 
76 Matt Sledge, ‘CIA’s Gus Hunt On Big Data: We “Try To Collect Everything And Hang On To It Forever”’, 
20tth March 2013, Huffington Post: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/20/cia-gus-hunt-big-
data_n_2917842.html cited in Clough et al, 2015 (footnote 74), p. 146. 
77 Mark Hansen, Feed Forward: On the Future of Twenty-First-Century Media (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2015), pp. 2, 5; see also Chun, 2016 (footnote 9).  
78 Brian Massumi, ‘The Autonomy of Affect’, in Cultural Critique, 31 (1995), pp. 83–109. 
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habits and relations of everyday life in process that we might activate the potential for 




This essay has explored how bringing theories of affect together with philosophies of habit 
might offer a generative framework for grappling with the logics, challenges and potentials of 
socio-political change today. As a means to complicate compelling yet arguably limited 
narratives of affective revolution, turning to pragmatist and continental philosophies is 
productive, I have suggested, because they highlight habit’s role in enabling what Ravaisson 
refers to as both ‘addiction’ and ‘grace’.79 Indeed, habit’s double nature makes it a rich 
concept for addressing the propensity of harmful socio-political patterns to persist in the face 
of efforts to generate greater affective awareness of their damaging effects, as well as the 
material forms of automation and coordination on which meaningful societal transformation 
may depend. From this perspective, neither affect or habit alone is sufficient to generate 
enduring forms of socio-political transformation. Rather, change is continually unfolding 
through evolving sets of relations in which interactions between the affective and the habitual 
are significant, if not always in predictable or even discernible ways. It is through learning to 
affectively inhabit change as it is happening, I have argued, that we might become better 
attuned to the speculative possibilities that everyday habit assemblages entail.   
   
Importantly, however, what is at stake in unpacking the relationship between habit and affect 
in this context is not only how change works at a material level but also what counts as 
change. Approaching habit through the lens of evolving assemblages and ecologies 
highlights powerfully the impossibility of preserving linear models of social progress and 
transformation. As I have discussed, narratives of social change premised on the force of 
feeling often focus on the transformative potential of turning point moments, pivotal events 
or revolutionary encounters. What attending to the dynamics of habit assemblages indicates, 
however, is the significance of linked moments of affecting and being affected, of habituation 
and re-habituation, that resound across time.80 Within this ontology of change, the 
accumulation and reverberation of seemingly minor interactions, gestures, affects and habits 
 
79 Ravaisson, [1838]2008 (footnote 18). 
80 Carrie Rentschler, Samantha Thrift, ‘Introduction: Doing feminism: Event, archive techne’, in Feminist 
Theory 16.3 (2015), pp. 239–249. 
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may be just as (or more) significant than major events. Though, as Dewey argues, change at 
the level of habit is itself potentially revolutionary.  
